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MACROPRUDENTIAL THEORY: ADVANCES AND CHALLENGES
This note discusses recent theoretical work analyzing the causes of financial instability, its 
consequences for the macroeconomy, and thus the potential role for macroprudential 
policy. After discussing how information asymmetries and strategic complementarities can 
cause balance sheet losses to propagate through the financial system and over time, we 
discuss the role of the major classes of macroprudential instruments in preventing 
instability ex ante and containing it ex post. We conclude with a discussion of current 
challenges for macroeconomic modeling and for the design of regulation and policy. 
The financial system trades payoffs across hypothetical states of the world, and across 
time. Therefore it is subject to certain inherent instabilities, in which the valuation of 
possible future outcomes makes equilibrium prices depend on the optimism or pessimism 
of investors. Uncertainty about hypothetical futures also makes finance and banking 
especially vulnerable to the corporate governance problems that are caused by asymmetric 
information and limited liability in all sectors of the economy. 
Events of the past decade have forced economists to face up to the risks posed by 
financial instability, so research on how policy should address financial instabilities and 
distortions has proliferated. This brief note provides a selective review of recent work, 
with the aim of identifying priorities for ongoing research.1 We start by recalling the role of 
microprudential policy, because many of the potential problems and policy instruments 
under discussion in the literature about macroprudential policy are closely related to 
issues already familiar from the microprudential context. Next, the note discusses how 
financial vulnerabilities may propagate across banks at a given point in time, and through 
time over the course of the business cycle. This macroeconomic perspective gives scope 
to ask which channels and instruments of macroprudential policy can address the 
propagation of financial vulnerabilities. The final section identifies major research 
challenges, and concludes. 
By aggregating risks (acquiring loans that pay out differently in different states of the world, 
in exchange for largely riskless cash that pays off in all states of the world) the banking 
system transforms numerous risky loans into a few safer assets, thus promoting investment 
and growth. In this credit provision function, banks must monitor the credit-worthiness of 
the investments of households, entrepreneurs, and firms. As banks specialize in a 
monitoring role, they acquire superior information to that held by their depositors, which 
implies that the equilibrium of the banking system may be distorted by asymmetric 
information problems such as moral hazard and adverse selection. 
On the other hand, by aggregating individual liquidity needs, a bank increases the 
predictability of its deposit outflows, permitting it to economize on reserves. In its liquidity 
provision role, the banking system safeguards depositors’ funds while providing immediate 
access when those depositors need to spend. Thus, banks’ long maturity loans are made 
on the basis of very short maturity funding, so maturity mismatch is inherent to the role of 
1  Hence, this note complements that of Mencía and Saurina (2016), who discuss indicators and instruments for 
macroprudential policy, especially those in use at the Banco de España. Here we provide an overview of recent 
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banking in the economy.2 Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) point out that the twin roles of 
the banking system (trade across time and trade across states of the world) are naturally 
complements: both liquidity provision and credit provision, whether as credit lines or as 
loans, require the bank to maintain a stock of liquid reserves. Therefore there is an efficiency 
motive for a single class of institutions to undertake both tasks. 
Given these two roles, banks are subject to two main sources of risk. First, due to corporate 
governance problems, banks may fail to adequately minimize the risks in their investment 
portfolios. As banks intermediate funds from savers to investors, their aggregation of risky 
assets represents an important insurance mechanism that insulates savers from idiosyncratic 
investment risks. The composition and relative size of a bank’s investments, relative to its 
funding, determines the riskiness of its balance sheet, summarized for example by its 
leverage ratio (the ratio of risky assets to the bank’s own equity). While leverage is an intrinsic 
aspect of intermediation, it magnifies risk in the bank’s portfolio, and may be suboptimally 
high. Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2013b) explain how shareholder-creditor 
conflict may build up excess leverage over time: once debt is in place, shareholders will 
consistently prefer to increase leverage by accumulating further assets without increasing 
bank equity, even when lower leverage would increase the total value of the bank. This 
leverage rachet effect occurs because the dilution costs of recapitalization are paid by 
shareholders only, while lower leverage increases the expected payoff for all stakeholders, 
including creditors. Excessive risk taking may also be driven by banks’ incentive to 
concentrate their portfolios on riskier assets, which depositors may fail to observe due to 
their informational disadvantage. This risk shifting effect results from the fact that shareholders 
benefit from higher returns but are protected from increased insolvency costs by their limited 
liability [see Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Bolton, Mehran, and Shapiro (2010)]. Moreover, 
the incentive to shift risks is increased for highly leveraged entities, so the leverage ratchet 
and risk shifting effects reinforce each other, pushing banks further from the socially optimal 
degree of risk taking. These governance problems between shareholders and creditors may 
also be reinforced by governance problems between managers and shareholders, since 
monitoring effort is difficult to observe [Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)]. 
A second risk is that, by providing liquidity insurance, banks expose themselves to the 
danger of runs. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argue that the occurrence of a run is a 
particularly severe form of inefficiency, since the bank’s balance sheet is also compatible 
with a different equilibrium in which no run occurs. Both the optimistic outcome, in which 
depositors keep their money in the bank(s), and the panic outcome, in which one or more 
banks fail, are rational equilibria under laissez faire; individual depositors can do nothing, 
in principle, to shepherd the market from one equilibrium outcome to another.3 While 
bank runs were once seen as a phenomenon related to retail banking, the recent financial 
crisis saw banks such as Bear Sterns suffering panics in which short-term wholesale 
funding was suddenly withdrawn. Creditors may gain de facto seniority if they hold assets 
that mature first relative to the other liabilities of borrowers, so that when there is 
uncertainty about default probabilities, both borrowers and new creditors have an 
incentive to shorten maturity at the expense of current creditors [Brunnermeier and 
2  Without claiming that mismatch can be eliminated entirely, Goodhart and Perotti (2015) argue that contemporary 
banking’s emphasis on long-term loan provision stretches mismatch to inefficient levels, compared with the 
discounting of trade credit that was the mainstay of the banking business through the first half of the twentieth century.
3  A large actor, such as the central bank, can influence expectations in a way that selects the Pareto dominant 
equilibrium. Therefore Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argue that a regime of deposit insurance may be welfare 
improving. On the other hand, the presence of deposit insurance diminishes the monitoring incentives of 
depositors and banks themselves, so that the lender of last resort function goes hand in hand with a supervisory 
function for the central bank.
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Oehmke (2013) call this the maturity rat race], implying excessive rollover risk. On the 
other hand, Calomiris and Kahn (1991) argued that short-term funding (demandable debt) 
can be an important discipline device to ensure that banks have an adequate incentive to 
monitor. In their model, a large wholesale funder holding demandable debt internalizes 
monitoring incentives, disciplining the bank, which allows small depositors to free ride in 
the monitoring decision. But while this might provide an efficient solution to the monitoring 
of a single bank, it still leaves the economy open to panics at the aggregate level. 
Moreover, Huang and Ratnovski (2011) reverse the conclusion of Calomiris and Kahn 
(1991), showing that if noisy public signals are available, then short-term wholesale 
funding may instead decrease monitoring incentives, triggering inefficient liquidations 
and increasing the frequency of bank runs. 
Faced with the likelihood of excessive risk in the banking system, policy makers intervene by 
supervising banks and by setting prudential policies at the micro level. Capital requirements, 
one of their key policy instruments, serve to internalize bank losses, mitigating problems of 
maturity mismatch, excessive risk, and leverage at the bank level. A common argument for 
reducing these requirements is that since equity is riskier than debt, it is a more expensive 
form of funding, so that requiring higher equity holdings leads to higher loan rates and lower 
credit. However, under the Modigliani-Miller conditions [Modigliani and Miller (1958)], this is 
untrue: even if equity is more expensive than debt, higher equity ratios decrease the probability 
of default, leaving the overall cost of funding unchanged. Even when the Modigliani-Miller 
conditions are violated (for example, if holding debt has tax benefits, or if there is a “money” 
premium on short-term debt that can be used as a transaction medium), the increase in the 
interest rate on loans due to capital requirements is unlikely to be large [Hanson, Kashyap, 
and Stein (2011), see also Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2013a)]. Recognizing 
that capital requirements may be insufficient to correct all possible biases – not least because 
managers may fail to fully represent the interests of shareholders – leverage and liquidity 
ratios have also been added recently as regulatory tools, aimed directly at correcting 
excessive leverage and excessive maturity mismatch, respectively.4 
The need for a macroeconomic approach to prudential financial regulation arises from a 
variety of externalities that may spread the vulnerabilities of individual institutions across 
the whole financial system. When an individual depositor withdraws her savings from a 
bank because she expects other clients to withdraw their deposits too, this is an example 
of a strategic complementarity – an externality in which an action chosen by any agent 
strengthens the incentives of other agents act in the same way. In the financial system, 
strategic complementarities can produce multiple equilibria (banking panics) at the level of 
a single bank, but they may also feed back across the whole banking system and produce 
additional externalities on the rest of the economy. Market-wide spillovers imply that the 
risk in the financial system is not just the sum of individual risks, but is endogenous, born 
out of the collective behaviour of financial entities. Risks propagate both through the 
cross-section of banks (“structural” propagation) and over time (“cyclical” propagation). 
Credit crunches and fire sales
The interaction between financial frictions and the business cycle was first explored by 
looking at the role of collateral and its valuation. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) 
explored a costly verification framework to show how binding collateral constraints could 
4  See De Nicolo, Gamba, and Lucchetta (2012) and Goodhart, Kashyap, Tsomocos, and Vardoulakis (2012) for 
general equilibrium frameworks that address the effects of each of these tools on the banking sector. 
3  Macroeconomic 
perspective
3.1  STRATEGIC 
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lower economic activity and amplify economic fluctuations. Lower cash reserves increase 
moral hazard problems within the firm, leading to a lower level of output, and thus to lower 
income for other firms. Although the initial focus was on firm collateral, the same framework 
was later applied to explore credit crunches generated through banking balance sheets 
[Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)]. 
Collateral feedback may go through the quantity of liquid resources available in the 
economy, as financial intermediaries are forced to sell assets at times when potential 
buyers lack sufficient liquidity [cash-in-the-market is low – see Allen and Gale (1994)]. 
But the feedbacks implied by this mechanism will go through prices as well as quantities 
[Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)]; lower prices caused by sales of distressed firms not only 
harm the current seller, but also all other holders of similar assets. Balance sheet losses 
then spread across the system, forcing other banks to sell too, lowering prices further 
and bringing new sellers to the market. Thus, individual bank problems spill over to the 
rest of the system through this pecuniary externality. This is inefficient, since market 
participants do not internalize the effect of their asset sales on the prices faced by other 
agents, so each participant chooses a lower liquidity buffer, ex ante, than the socially 
optimal level. 
While in the first instance fire sales affect the prices of assets in distress, they may also 
spill over to other asset types. Manconi, Massa, and Yasuda (2012) show that during the 
recent financial crisis, mutual funds needing liquidity chose to sell assets other than 
securitized bonds, since these were seen as “toxic”, so fire sales spilled over from 
securitized to corporate bonds, and corporate spreads increased. Fire sales can also be 
amplified through their interactions with funding and risk management considerations. 
Garleanu and Pedersen (2007) argue that since banks restrict balance sheet holdings in 
order to abide by a liquidity-adjusted value at risk (LVaR) constraint, tighter risk 
management may lead to a general reduction in asset holding. As a result, all participants 
face longer expected selling times, implying higher risk over the now longer holding 
period, which further tightens risk management, producing added downward pressure 
on prices. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) focus on the role of funding on triggering 
pecuniary externalities. Financial institutions use asset holdings as collateral to fund 
their balance sheet holdings. A lower value of the underlying asset used as collateral 
reduces funding capacity, generating a constraint on asset holdings, an increase in sell 
orders and lower asset prices, which further decreases funding capacity as funding 
margins increase. 
Flight to quality and liquidity; risk shifting 
Strategic complementarities in the overall level of activity may also be reinforced by 
feedbacks in the type of investment undertaken. A credit crunch may feature a shift out of 
riskier (more productive) investments, and into safer or more liquid (less productive) assets. 
These could include shifts out of real investment and into government bonds, or shifts 
from one class of real assets to another (for example, from small to large firms). 
The scope for these ex post shifts out of risk may be increased by inefficiently high risk 
taking ex ante. Limited liability may make riskier assets attractive to banks, due to their 
potential upside gain. These riskier assets may have higher [Allen and Gale (2004)] or 
lower [Repullo (2004)] expected payoffs ex ante; in either case, shifting into riskier as-sets 
will be especially attractive when expected profits are low, which means that greater 
banking competition may increase risk shifting. Greater risk-taking ex ante means that a 
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crisis, if it occurs, will be more severe. In this way, risk shifting externalities may reinforce 
other types of strategic complementarities discussed earlier. In particular, they may make 
the economy vulnerable to a flight to quality when pessimism sets in. 
Asset commonalities 
Strategic complementarities may also be driven by investors’ asset allocation decisions, if 
the payoff to a certain asset class increases with the fraction of other agents choosing the 
same investment strategy. Acharya (2009) presents a framework where systemic risk results 
from endogenously chosen correlation of returns on assets held by banks. The limited 
liability of banks, combined with a negative externality of one bank’s failure on the health of 
other banks, gives rise to a systemic risk-shifting incentive where all banks undertake 
correlated investments, thereby increasing economy-wide aggregate risk. Wagner (2010) 
and Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2012) also explore mechanisms where diversification is 
privately beneficial but increases the likelihood of systemic events as portfolios become 
more similar. 
Similarities of portfolio allocation across financial intermediaries may also result from the 
prospect of government bailouts. Anticipating that simultaneous bank failures trigger a 
bailout (preventing a systemic event) banks may find it optimal to correlate risk taking, so 
that any bank failure is also a system failure [Farhi and Tirole (2012)]. Peer benchmarking 
may also generate externalities across banks, leading to asset commonality, since poor 
performance may overlooked by the market if many other banks suffer similar losses, 
while losing alone harms the banker’s reputation [see Rajan (1994)]. 
SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration.
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Modes of propagation through the financial system 
The discussions above have implicitly assumed that the decisions of individual banks and 
firms are driven by aggregate prices and quantities of risky and liquid assets. But feedbacks 
in the interbank market may instead have a network structure, in which a bank failure spills 
over to the rest of the system primarily through domino effects on other banks with which it 
interacts closely. These domino effects may result from direct linkages or from cross trading 
(counterparty effects). Allen and Gale (2000) analyze how contagion acts under different 
network structures, and show that incomplete networks are more prone to contagion than 
complete structures. Also, greater connectivity typically reduces the likelihood of widespread 
default as it increases the ability of a network to absorb shocks. However, when large 
shocks occur, their effects are amplified, since more counterparties are affected. Rochet 
and Tirole (1996) also analyse the risk of systemic crises due to interconnectedness in the 
interbank market, making clear that systemic importance depends on connections, as well 
as size. Information contagion is another possible form of propagation: any bank failure 
may cast doubt about the solvency of other market participants that have similar asset and 
liability structures [Brunnermeier, Goodhart, Persaud, Crockett, and Shin (2009)]. But while 
some central banks have made efforts to model the network structure of their national 
financial systems [e.g. Gai, Haldane, and Kapadia (2011)], the ultimate mechanisms are not 
so different from models in which feedbacks occur through aggregate quantities and prices: 
strategic complementarities in risk-taking and/or liquidity demand may lead to multiple 
equilibria or to inefficiently low activity within a single equilibrium. 
The propagation of financial disturbances across firms and financial institutions naturally 
generates propagation over time as well. Credit crunches and fire sales persist over time 
because they leave lower profits in their wake, decreasing the cash and collateral available 
to support the next round of investment decisions. But other relevant mechanisms are 
also at work. Crucially, an intertemporal analysis places focus on the contrasting welfare 
implications associated with ex post and ex ante perspectives on policy responses to 
financial instability. 
Limited commitment 
Existing literature on credit crunches and fire sales mostly takes collateral constraints as 
given and focuses on ex post policy analysis, asking how to stabilize the financial system 
and the economy in response to exogenous shocks. But some recent papers dig deeper, 
using models in which demand for cash and other collateralizable arises endogenously to 
study whether borrowing in boom times might be excessive, making the economy 
vulnerable to excessively sharp crashes. Lorenzoni (2008) and Bianchi (2011) present 
models where ex ante macroprudential policies that reduce borrowing are optimal. In their 
models, borrowers have a limited ability to commit to future repayments (called 
nonpledgeability or limited commitment), which makes collateral valuable if additional 
liquidity is needed before investments pay off. Since firms and households fail to take into 
account the fire sale externalities that asset liquidation imposes on other investors, their 
ex ante borrowing level tends to be too high, leading to excessive volatility ex post. 
Gersbach and Rochet (2012) apply a similar framework to the banking system, 
incorporating a financial friction that limits banks’ borrowing, to study banks’ balance 
sheet decisions. They show that banks allocate too much borrowing capacity to good 
states of the world (overborrowing) and too little to bad states (underborrowing). This is 
because banks fail to incorporate the effects of their decisions on the price of capital (a 
pecuniary externality), implying that this price is too high in good states, increasing bank 
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equity (banks are overcapitalized) and too low in bad states, depressing bank equity 
(banks become undercapitalized). Hence, these contributions highlight how financial 
frictions and pecuniary externalities generate cyclical mechanisms that lead to excessive 
borrowing in booms (which could be offset by macroprudential policy) and excessively 
deep recessions (which could be offset by macroeconomic stabilization). 
Information flow and learning 
Alternatively, overborrowing and excess volatility can also be explained by departing from 
rational expectations, to consider different processes for expectation formation. Simply 
put, over-reliance on recent experience may cause investors to take excessive risks in 
good times, and to panic and overreact when a downturn hits. On one hand, Gennaioli, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (2012 and 2015) explain how the dependence of expectations on more 
frequently seen (salient) states of the world can generate excessive debt issuance and 
neglect of tail risks. Investors overreact to a series of good news, because such a series is 
representative of a good state. A few negative announcements will not change their minds 
because the good state is still representative, but a sufficient amount of bad news leads to 
a radical change in investors’ beliefs and to a financial crisis. Likewise, similar results can 
also be derived from models of learning – particularly learning about growth rates (rather 
than levels) of asset prices. Broer and Kero (2011) show that a framework with uncertainty 
and learning about the persistence of volatility regimes is able to replicate the asset price 
increases observed during the great moderation (low volatility regime) and its reverse upon 
the return to the high volatility regime. Gelain, Lansing, and Mendicino (2013) show how 
learning about the house price process can better explain large fluctuations in house 
prices, and they explore loan-to-value ratios and other macroprudential policies in a macro 
model with learning. 
Financial cycles 
The cyclical mechanisms discussed above link financial frictions with the business cycle, 
focusing on amplification of output fluctuations, and how boom times may promote 
overborrowing via pricing externalities or expectations formation. However, Borio (2014) 
and Drehmann, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2012) argue that “financial cycles”, identifiable as 
a fluctuation in financial variables – especially leverage ratios and asset prices – are of 
lower frequency and greater amplitude than the business cycle itself. Therefore, there may 
be instances where economic conditions are improving but the financial cycle remains 
depressed, and even situations where booms and busts coincide. Following Minsky (1986) 
closely, they associate the boom in the financial cycle with the existence of financial 
imbalances that signal a buildup of risk that may result in a crisis. On the other hand, they 
also emphasize that the duration and amplitude of financial cycles has varied greatly over 
time. Thus, even though they show that downturns of the financial cycle are frequently 
accompanied by financial crises, actually predicting the timing of crises on the basis of this 
evidence, without further understanding the mechanisms that drive these fluctuations and 
how they related to output fluctuations, remains exceedingly difficult. 
The main macroprudential instruments fall into three main categories: capital, liquidity and 
credit instruments. Capital-related instruments include flat and countercyclical capital 
requirements, leverage ratios, and restrictions on profit distribution. Liquidity instruments 
include limits on maturity mismatch and reserve requirements. Credit instruments include 
caps on loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, caps on debt-to-income (DTI) ratios, leverage ratios, 
and ceilings on credit or credit growth. 
4  Macroprudential 
policy - instruments 
and implementation 
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Flat capital requirements 
Capital requirements have long been imposed on the banking sector, although their main 
purpose has been to guarantee the solvency of individual financial intermediaries instead 
of mitigating systemic risk. As a result, the current debate has centered on the need to 
increase capital requirements to avoid the repercussions for the rest of economy when a 
bank cannot absorb losses due to insufficient equity. Higher regulatory capital requirements 
force shareholders to increase their exposure to declines in the value of their assets 
(increasing the “skin in the game”). As such, higher requirements weaken the problems 
caused by limited liability, including the leverage rachet and risk shifting effects, thus 
decreasing the likelihood of fire sales, credit crunches, and flights to quality, and they also 
decrease the degree of asset commonalities in financial intermediation. 
Leverage ratio 
Capital requirements are normally set based on the size and composition of assets held by 
banks, reflecting the underlying risk of the portfolio of assets, often measured in terms of 
Risk Weighted Assets (RWAs). The risk weights set by the Basel III framework are intended 
to capture the variability of credit risk exposures across different bank portfolios. However, 
risk assessment is in many cases based on banks’ own internal models, or is based on 
current pricing. Hence, any deviations in risk perception or pricing due to the structural 
and cyclical mechanisms discussed above that generate excessive leverage and risk 
taking, might also lead to a downward bias in capital requirements. Therefore, leverage 
ratios, which constrain the ratio of assets to capital, are also advocated as an additional 
instrument to reduce systemic risk. Leverage ratios can be set at the bank level (Basel III) 
or at the aggregate level [see Gersbach and Hahn (2011)] in association with capital 
requirements. Leverage ratios directly target the leverage rachet effect, and also affect the 
key structural propagation mechanisms, as flat capital requirements do. Moreover, given 
that the biases in risk assessment tend to be procyclical, leverage ratios could also offset 
limited commitment problems, correcting for the possibility of overborrowing. 
Countercyclical capital requirements 
Fixed capital requirements and leverage ratios impact excessive leverage and risk in a 
time-independent way and thus work primarily against structural propagation mechanisms. 
Countercyclical capital requirements or buffers, which have recently been introduced in 
the Basel III framework, are directly aimed at attenuating cyclical mechanisms. The 
proposed adjustments of those buffers are linked with the medium-term movements in 
financial cycles; they are currently based on a set of statistical indicators that track financial 
cycles. The mechanisms that drive financial cycles are remain poorly understood, making 
it difficult to assess whether the adjustments are inefficiently curbing credit growth or are 
instead decreasing systemic risk optimally. 
Liquidity ratios and levies 
Maturity mismatch is intrinsic to financial intermediation, since short-term funding is the 
essence of liquidity provision, but it may also generate negative systemic externalities 
through fire sales, flight to liquidity, and counterparty risk. Thus, while a bank’s decision 
reflects its own exposure to refinancing risk, it has no incentive to consider its effects on 
the rest of the financial system, so from a systemic perspective it relies excessively on 
short-term funding. This suggests that additional regulation to constrain refinancing 
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exposure to the socially optimal level is needed. This can be done by setting liquidity 
ratios, as in the new Basel III framework, or levies (Pigouvian taxes) on liquidity exposure 
[Perotti and Suárez (2011)]. 
LTV and DTI ratios 
Another set of instruments that address excessive leverage and borrowing, but which 
control market outcomes directly instead of controlling banks’ balance sheets, are loan-
to-value (LTV) and debt-to-income (DTI) ratios. The first looks directly at the housing 
market, since sharp increases in house prices are strongly associated with the peak of a 
financial cycle. DTI ratios are more general, and attempt to curb all forms of credit growth. 
Since these instruments are based on borrowers’ asset position, rather than that of the 
financial institution, they have the advantage that they are effective for controlling 
excessive credit growth regardless of whether it comes from traditional banks or from the 
shadow banking system. 
Other prudential measures 
A number of other measures and institutional changes have recently been discussed. In 
order to correct for the limited liability problem without generating excessive deleveraging, 
regulators have recently introduced restrictions on profit distributions, forcing banks to 
achieve sufficient capital by retaining more earnings rather than cutting lending. As regards 
the problems of crisis propagation through the financial system, regulators have recently 
promoted changes to improve monitoring of banking network structures and have 
introduced additional balance sheet requirements for systemically important financial 
institutions to increase their Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC). This new regulation 
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ensures a better and faster resolution of banking crises, mitigating potential spillovers 
through the banking network. The need for a framework to oversee payments and securities 
systems, monitoring over-the-counter markets, has also been receiving some attention in 
the effort to decrease systemic risk. 
Finally, an important aspect of implementation is how discretionary each policy instrument 
should be. On the one hand, ruled-based policies are predictable, reduce uncertainty, and 
cannot be modified depending on current pressures or conditions. On the other hand, a 
discretionary approach allows policymakers to improve their understanding of how 
macroprudential policies impact the financial markets and the economy, improving policy 
judgments. As our understanding of the main mechanisms and impacts of policy interventions 
increases, rule-based interventions should perhaps become the norm, increasing transparency 
and accountability. But continuing financial innovation and regulatory arbitrage could justify 
maintaining some degree of discretion.
We conclude by looking at major areas where further analysis is warranted, both in terms 
of theory and of policy design. 
The literature on macroprudential policies has advanced considerably in the last few years, 
particularly in identifying important mechanisms that may generate suboptimal outcomes 
and may increase the probability of systemic events. Nonetheless, incorporating structural 
mechanisms that address fire-sales and other corporate governance imperfections in a 
dynamic setting that allows for persistent effects that quantitatively match observed 
financial cycles remains a challenge. Hence, a unifying framework that is adequate for 
analyzing the tradeoffs of macroprudential policies is still lacking. Apart from the general 
difficulty of incorporating multiple mechanisms into a single framework of financial 
intermediation, the modeling task might involve dealing with (i) heterogeneity, (ii) multiplicity 
of equilibrium and (iii) departures from rational expectations. 
A rapidly advancing DSGE literature adds financial frictions to standard macroeconomic 
models. Heterogeneity ought to be explored further here, since collateral constraints and 
other types of financial frictions are largely irrelevant in representative agent models. 
Another weakness of this literature is that the dynamics are driven by exogenous shocks. 
It is still essential to try to derive financial shocks and/or crises from feedbacks in 
imperfect financial markets, as the policy implications of endogenous fluctuations may 
differ from those of exogenous shocks. Better frameworks for addressing multiplicity of 
equilibrium could be helpful in modeling endogenous fluctuations. Finally, although the 
empirical regularities around financial cycles seemed well documented in, for instance, 
Drehmann, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2012), the mechanisms that drive financial variables 
and differentiate financial cycles from the more familiar output cycles remain elusive. 
Models of learning may prove crucial for modeling the financial cycle; Minsky’s (1986) 
theory suggests that innovations in the recent past are salient for investment behavior, 
and plausible calibrations of learning models often imply fluctuations of much lower 
frequency than rational expectations models do. 
Two recent papers have addressed some of these concerns, providing general equilibrium 
frameworks for studying financial instability and policy interventions. Boissay, Collard, and 
Smets (2016) build a tractable DSGE model with an interbank market in which moral 
hazard and asymmetric information may generate banking crises, credit crunches, and 
ultimately a severe financial recession. In accordance with the empirical evidence these 
recessions are infrequent, are more likely to occur following a credit boom, and are not 
5  Challenges in theory 
and policy design 
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triggered by an especially large negative exogenous shock. Brunnermeier and Sannikov 
(2014) study a more stylized general equilibrium model in which collateral constraints 
cause asset prices to vary with the fraction of total wealth held by entrepreneurs. Rather 
than analyzing fluctuations around a single steady state, the authors describe the full, 
global dynamics of their economy, and show that it tends to fluctuate around two persistent 
states, a “normal” situation in which risk has only a small effect on asset prices, and a 
“crisis” state in which investment is reduced by a high risk premium, which can only be 
escaped through a slow process of deleveraging. A key source of risk for entrepreneurs in 
their model is the endogenous riskiness of the price of capital. An important finding is that 
price volatility may increase when the variance of exogenous shocks falls. That is, less 
exogenous risk (or improved diversification through financial innovation) may cause 
entrepreneurs to leverage up in normal times, increasing the endogenous component of 
risk and making crises, when they arrive, more severe.5 
Major challenges for effective regulation include determining the appropriate size and type 
of interventions, and anticipating potential side-effects both within and across sectors. 
Firstly, given the lack of a widely-accepted macroeconomic model that encompasses 
financial crises and macroprudential policy, quantitative analyses are still lacking. For 
instance, the appropriate level of capital requirements is hotly contested. Admati, DeMarzo, 
Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2013a) discuss a series of misconceptions regarding banking 
capital (e.g. “equity is expensive”, “capital implies banks set aside resources that are not 
used, restricting lending”) and claim that higher capital, as required by the new Basel III 
framework, entails large social benefits at minimal or no social cost. De Nicolo, Gamba, 
and Lucchetta (2012) argue that even if capital requirements are initially beneficial, there is 
a point where further increases become costly, reducing lending, efficiency, and welfare. 
Note that this conclusion hinges on the restrictions to equity issuance assumed in their 
framework. Another relevant consideration is whether regulation should focus on prices or 
quantities. Perotti and Suárez (2011) discuss this issue in the context of policy to control 
liquidity exposure. They show that quantity constraints are preferred when risk taking 
incentives are heterogenous across banks, while levies are preferred when heterogeneity 
is on the capacity to generate gains in intermediation (bank quality); therefore a combination 
of instruments might be optimal in general. Finally, adjustments to countercyclical capital 
buffers are at present largely discretionary, loosely based on a set of indicators that have 
proven to correlate to booms in financial cycles. 
Regulatory interventions can have important side-effects and potential leakages. For 
instance, countercyclical capital requirements are set to control increases in systemic risk 
during periods of positive credit and asset price growth. However, as Horvath and Wagner 
(2013) show, countercyclical capital requirements also create incentives to invest in 
correlated activities, as it is relatively more costly to be forced to re-capitalize in booms. This 
may lead to higher degree of asset commonality, which increases systemic risk. As for 
potential side-effects, Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek (2014) show that after an increase in 
capital requirements in the UK, regulated banks do decrease credit supply. However, 
unregulated banks (resident foreign branches) increase lending in response to tighter capital 
requirements on a relevant reference group of regulated banks. Thus, they observe a leakage 
within the banking sector. An important question requiring further exploration is how 
macroprudential policies aimed at the banking sector affect other financial intermediaries, 
5  The paper of Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) also illustrates the techical advantages of moving from traditional 
discrete-time macroeconomic models to continuous-time modeling, which may prove more tractable for nonlinear 
analysis of economies with financial frictions. 
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and what role these might play in generating externalities and increasing systemic risk. 
Further constraints on commercial banks are likely to increase the importance of shadow 
banks, which were already the entities responsible for most of the increased leverage 
observed during the pre-crisis period. Adrian (2014) discusses regulatory policies 
directed towards shadow banks. His proposal highlights the need to shift the regulatory 
instruments from institutions to types of transactions (for example, LTV ratios are 
regulations that shift the focus from banks’ balance sheets to requirements on mortgage 
contracts). Finally, non-leveraged investors like hedge funds, who are motivated by 
relative performance ranking, might exacerbate asset price volatility [Feroli, Kashyap, 
Schoenholtz, and Shin (2014)]. 
Monetary and macroprudential policies are clearly linked. By setting short-term interest 
rates, monetary policy affects credit and interest rate spreads, and thus influences (future) 
financial stability. Macroprudential policy, by curbing excessive leverage and risk taking, 
influences the terms and conditions of credit, and thereby the real economy and the rate 
of inflation. A recurring question is whether some degree of coordination is needed in this 
reciprocal relationship, recognizing that monetary policy has a role to play in financial 
stability, or whether these policies can instead by conducted largely independently. 
The pro-independence view claims that (i) interest rates are not an adequate instrument to 
control financial stability and as such leaning against the wind cannot solve debt problems 
[Svensson (2014)]; (ii) even if monetary policy is effective in influencing financial stability, 
monetary policymaking should ignore it since otherwise the goal of controlling inflation 
effectively would be undermined [Weidmann (2014)]; and (iii) if macroprudential regulations 
are found to deal appropriately with all relevant externalities, there would be no need for 
monetary policy to focus on issues of systemic risk. 
The pro-collaboration view stresses that monetary policy affects financial stability mostly 
through incentives to take risk. Prolonged periods of low interest rates may lead investors 
to “search for yield”, promoting credit issuance, reducing premia and increasing asset 
prices [Borio and Zhu (2008), Morris and Shin (2014)]. This mechanism might be important 
to understand the dynamics of financial cycles and hence, monetary policy should also 
incorporate financial stability objectives, at least in the expansionary phase of the cycle 
[see Stein (2011) and Borio and White (2003)].
Ajello, Laubach, López-Salido, and Nakata (2015) build a framework that attempts to quantify 
the potential tradeoffs for monetary policy-making when financial stability is a concern; they 
assume that the probability of crisis varies with credit and thus with the interest rate. They 
show that the optimal adjustment of interest rates due to stability concerns is generally small 
but may be higher if the central bank is uncertain about how interest rates affect financial 
stability. The crucial element then is to analyze how interest rate movements and the 
probability of a crisis are linked. Given that financial cycles seem to be of lower frequency, 
this might be related to interest rate persistence, which is not explored in their model. 
Moreover, using interest rates to decrease the stock of debt is not straightforward: tighter 
policy may reduce inflation and disposable income more quickly than the stock of debt, 
thereby increasing real debt and the debt-to-income ratio. Hence, using prudential 
instruments to influence the probability of a crisis might be more efficient. 
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